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IN THE, S·UP'REME CO·URT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. P. ROGERS and MAGNA MINING COMPANY, a New Mexico
Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No.
8787

UNITED WESTERN MINERALS
COMPANY, a Deleware Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
AND APPELLANT

APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4
·The Statement of Facts set forth in the original
Brief filed herein by Defendant and Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Appellant, has been accepted by
Plaintiffs and Respondents in their Brief as being "substantially accurate to the extent it has gone." Plaintiffs
and Respondents, hereinafter referred to as Respondents,
added to the Statement of Facts only one item, that being
a certain letter (R. 29) referred to by Plaintiffs andRespondents in their Brief and set forth in the Appendix
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thereto as Exhibit I. We are indebted to Respondents for
including this particular letter in their Brief. If any
doubt existed at any time or in the minds of any persons
as to the meaning of the parties in connection with the
August 4, 1955 Agreement (Exhibit "A" in the Appendix
to Appellant's original Brief), that doubt was utterly
and completely removed by the parties themselves when
they drafted, agreed to, executed and approved the said
letter from which we quote the following excerpts:
" ... The terms of the Agreement, dated August 4, 1955, call for the following consideration
payable by United Western Minerals Company,
in addition to the amount of $125,000 to be paid
out of 15% of the gross mineral production from
the Coleman Canyon Group of claims."
"The consideration of the Coleman Canyon
Group, in addititon to the above mentioned payment out of mineral production, is $15,000 in cash
and $15,000 in cash or common stock of our company, valued at $1.00 per share."
" ... The date for the beginning of payments
out of gross mineral production, provided for in
clause 3 of the Agreement of August -!, 1955, will
be postponed until April4, 1956."
"Kindly signify your approval of the foregoing terms for payment of the consideration payable under the Agreement of August 4, 1955, by
signing the endorsement at the foot of this letter."
This letter on the stationery of the Defendant was
signed by its President, Alva A. Sin1pson~ Jr., and was
approved in writing by both Plaintiffs, W. P. Rogers
and Magna ~{ining Company. It sho\YS clearly that the
$125,000 amount was to be paid out of 15% of the gross
mineral production, and that any obligation to pay that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
amount was dependent on mineral production which in
turn was dependent on the presence of ore in commercial
quantities. No mention of any kind was made of a monthly minimum payment requirement regardless of mineral
production or which would indicate by any stretch of the
imagination that a minimum payment was required even
though ores and minerals could not be produced from the
claims in commercial quantities.
By this letter the parties themselves not only interpreted their contract but they placed their interpretation
in writing. We agree with Respondents as set forth on
page 2 of their Brief that the interpretation of a contract
given by the parties themselves is the best evidence of
their intent. 12 Am. J ur. 787 discusses the interpretation
of contracts by the parties thereto and uses this language:
"In the determination of the meaning of an
indefinite or ambiguous contract, the interpretation placed upon the contract by the parties themselves is to be considered by the court and is
entitled to great, if not controlling, influence in
ascertaining their understanding of its terms.
In fact the courts will generally follow such practical interpretation of a doubtful contract. It is to
be assumed that parties to a contract know best
what was meant by its terms and are the least
likely to be mistaken as to its intention; that each
party is alert to protect his own interests and to
insist on his rights; and that whatever is done by
the parties during the period of the performance
of the contract is done under its terms as they
understood and intended it should be. Parties are
far less likely to have been mistaken as to the
meaning of their contract during the period when
they are in harmony and practical interpretation
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reflects that meaning than when subsequent differences have impelled them to resort to law and
one of them then seeks an interpretation at variance with their practical interpretation of its provisions. Where the language of a contract is
uncertain and the parties thereto, by their subsequent acts and conduct, have shown that they
construed it alike and within the purview of the
constructions permitted as possible by such language, the courts will ordinarily follow such
adopted construction as the correct one. It has
even been said that the practical interpretation of
the ambiguous terms of a contract will be adopted,
although the language used may more strongly
suggest another interpretation."
We feel that the agreement itself is unambiguous and
clear and that when it is read in its entirety and is analyzed pursuant to established rules of logic and reason
and from a grammatical standpoint, and when consideration is duly given to the language used by the parties
themselves, there can be no doubt that the obligation to
pay the $125,000 amount depended entirely on the existence of a situation under which "ore or minerals can be
produced therefrom in commercial quantities."
However, if any ambiguity existed in the contract,
the same was resolved by the parties "~hen they approved
the wording and language of the N oven1ber 2, 1955, letter
referred to above.
To give to the contract the interpretation contended
for by Respondents in their Brief requires not an interpretation of the contract but a revision thereof. Such construction requires that no effect or consideration be given
to the following clause contained in sub-paragraph (c)
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of paragraph 2 of the Agreement: "shall be paid for out
of 15% of the gross mineral production from said group
of claims," and to eliminate from the contract or give no
effect to the following words and provisions from paragraph 3 thereof: " ... so long as ore or minerals can be
produced therefrom in commercial quantities ... " and
" ... in lieu of production." In other words, instead of
having said paragraph read as it now does, it is necessary that the contract be modified to exclude part of the
provisions or to give no consideration to them so that in
the guise of contruing the contract the same is actually
re-written to read as follows:
"As to the payment of the purchase price ...
there shall be no actual payment due to Sellers
by Buyer for six months after the date of this
Agreement; howeve~, the obligation shall accrue
... even though the payment is delayed until six
months after the date of this Agreement. Thereafter, payment shall be made monthly . . . ;provided, however, that Buyer ... shall pay Sellers
the sum of $500 each and every month ... The
sum of $500.00 per month so paid shall be credited
upon the unpaid balance of the purchase price."
Where we have indicated a succession of periods in
the above paragraph, it is to show that certain words and
provisions used by the parties and which must be given
due meaning and consideration have been eliminated,
since the construction placed on the contract by the Plaintiffs and Respondents and by the lower Court requires
such elimination.
Again in paragraph 10 of the Agreement it is provided that payments are to be made out of production
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or in the sum of $500.00 per month if Defendant fails to
operate and mine the claims "as hereinabove provided,"
which ties the duty of payment to production and to the
availability of ore and minerals in commercial quantities.
When we come to the letter of November 2, 1955,
above referred to, again it is clear that the construction
contended for by Plaintiffs and Respondents requires not
an interpretation of the letter but a revision thereof and
an elimination therefrom of very pertinent parts and
provisions. Furthermore, the construction of the next
to the last paragraph of the November 2, 1955, letter is
determined by the same considerations as the construction of clause 3 of the original Agreement.
In reply to some of the statements made by Plaintiffs and Respondents in their Brief, we agree that while
the parties were not conscious at the time of executing
the Agreement of "highly academic requirements of logic
and grammar," they still meant what they said and they
still intended that the statements they made and the provisions they incorporated were to be given a reasonable
and logical construction and that the various 'Yords, explanations and statements made by them "~ere to be considered and not ignored.
Furthermore, contrary to the statements made in
Respondent's Brief, Appellants did not have an unqualified obligation to produce but had an obligation to produce only so long as ore or 1ninerals could be produced
in commercial quantities or if they failed to do so, then
to pay a Ininilnu1n n1onthly pay1nent. The parties so
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stated and they had a reason for so stating. Again, contrary to the statement made in Respondents' Brief, the
language is not that Appellant shall "pay $500.00 per
month in lieu of mining and producing said claims," but
the language as actually quoted from the contract itself
and not from Respondents' distorted interpretation
thereof is that "buyer shall have the obligation of either
continuously mining and operating said claims so long
as ore or minerals can be produced therefrom in commercial quantities, or if it fails to do so, shall pay Sellers
the sum of $500.00 each and every month in lieu of production."
We agree that the parties contemplated a situation
where ore might be present or might not be present and
so they provided for a sale price of $155,000.00, $30,000.00
of which was to be paid in any event and the balance of
which, namely, $125,000 was to be paid "out of 15% of the
gross mineral production from said group of claims."
The Buyer assumed all the risks with respect to part of
the total amount, that is, $30,000.00, but as to the balance
the parties stated that it was to be paid only out of gross
mineral production, which would depend on the availability of ores and minerals on the claims. If such ores
and minerals existed, then the Buyer was given an option
to continuously mine and operate the claims so long as
ores or minerals could be produced in commercial quantities or to pay a minimurn of $500.00 per month in lieu
thereof. Since the payment of this $125,000.00 was to be
out of production there was not an unqualified obligation
to produce since this cannot be reconciled with the reali-
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ties of the situation, for it is obviously impossible to produce ore if there is no ore present.
Therefore, the parties themselves agreed that if ores
existed and could be produced in commercial quantities,
the $125,000 amount was payable out of production except
that, if for any reason Buyer did not want to continuously
mine and operate or for any reason failed to do so (ore
being available), then it was required to pay $500.00
monthly in lieu of production. What could be more
realistic and practical~
If the parties had intended an absolute obligation on
the part of Appellant to pay the $125,000.00 amount, they
would have provided to that effect and would have set
forth required periodic instalment payments without any
reference to production or availability of commercial
ores. Instead, the whole obligation was to pay out of
production or to pay minimum monthly payments if
Buyer failed to produce so long as ores and minerals
could be produced in commercial quantities.
·Appellant has not taken the position ~'that should it
not see fit to make the property productive, the unpaid
purchase price would be forgiven," as stated in Respondents' Brief, P. 9. Instead, it has contended that the
obligation to pay the $125,000 amount depended upon
the existence on the claims of ore and minerals which
conld be produced in commercial quantities. The Lower
Court failed to require Respondents to prove that such
situation existed and also refused to permit Appellant
to show that the exploratory progran1 undertaken by it
disproved the existence of a connnercial ore body.
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Appellant has paid $30,000.00 consideration for the
Coleman Canyon claims, which payment was not made
contingent on production. It has paid a great sum of
money in exploratory work, development, roads, etc. The
Respondents are now endeavoring to make it pay for
something which is absolutely worthless and on which
no ore body exists in commercial quantities and which
would enable Appellant to make the payments which the
parties themselves made dependent on the existence of
ores or minerals producible from the claims in commercial quantities.
APPELLANT'S POINT 5
Appellant respectfully submits that Respondents'
Brief does not answer the arguments stated in Appellant's Brief on Point 5. Respondents Amended Complaint
was not further amended at either the trial or pre-trial.
There is no question of inconsistent remedies being asked.
Instead the pleadings asked one remedy and were not
amended. The election was thereby made. By its PreTrial Order and Judgment the Lower Court gave Respodents a remedy not mentioned in their pleadings, but
which was also inconsistent with the remedy they elected
in their pleadings to pursue.
Respectfully Submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS
& MATTSSON
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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